Napoleon On Taking Risks In War & The Rebirth of The Art of War In Modern Times

An excerpt from, “Napoleon On War” Edited By Bruno Colson, Translated By Gregory Elliott, Oxford University Press, 2015, Pg. 58 – 59:

During his long military career, Napoleon personally ran the risks of war. He suffered no serious injuries, but had several brushes with death. At the siege of Toulon, he was wounded in the forehead (15 November 1793), thrown to the ground by the force of a cannonball (16 December), and pierced by a bayonet or polearm thrust into his left thigh (17 December). On 23 April 1809, in front of Ratisbon, he was struck in the heel by a bullet. Although not deep, the wound was very painful. The following 6 July, at Wagram, a shell exploded in front of his horse. Another grazed General Oudinot beside him. At the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, on 20 March 1814, the Emperor indicated various emplacements to be captured and a shell fell just in front of a company. To show them he was afraid of nothing, Napoleon pushed his horse forward onto the shell and kept it stationary near the smoking projectile. It exploded and the horse was ripped apart, and collapsed amid the smoke with its rider, who emerged unscathed and got on to a new mount. This list of episodes is not exhaustive. In total, Napoleon had eighteen horses killed or wounded under him. On Saint Helena he discoursed on the risks run by generals:

There are men who are lucky in war. From the Empire onwards, Murat was never wounded, and every day made jabs at the advance guard. Ney was never wounded. Massena was never wounded. I wasn’t dangerously wounded when I was hit in front of Ratisbon. That light contusion gave me a fever. Had it been necessary to give battle that day, I would probably not have been what I was in other circumstances. Such is man: an disposition affects his head. 

I had my legs stretched out in the palace of Archduke Maurice in Ratisbon when I received a delegation from Switzerland. I was in a bad mood. I was suffering.

In our battles, the generals are much more exposed than they used to be. When people fought hand to hand, they could only be wounded close up. Alexander does not seem to have been. Today, a girl of 15, dressed as a hussar, will kill a hero, the most vigorous of men. Artillery spares no one. There are scarcely any battles where I haven’t had some people killed in my group. When I occasionally approached an entrenchment in a moment of crisis, it was not pleasant for the person in command: ‘Does the Emperor think we require his presence to do our duty?’

The value of a soldier is not that of a captain; the value of a captain is not that of a divisional commander. If the latter is killed or wounded, the day’s outcome will certainly change or, at any rate, probably change. He must not therefore expose himself gratuitously.

Pg. 205:

For Napoleon, battle should not be given lightly. Favourable conditions must exist: battle should be joined where one has a 70 percent chance of success. If this is the case, all available troops must play their part and display energy and determination. One does not pull out of a battle without incurring a severe penalty, for retreat leads to heavy loss. In this sense, ‘the glory and honour of arms’ are the best guarantee of men’s safety. Napoleon always began his campaigns by seeking battle, for he sought to finish them rapidly, but he knew how to await favourable circumstances. As at Ulm in 1805, these sometimes allowed him to secure victory without fighting.

An excerpt from, “Napoleon: The Art of War & Power – Based on Napoleon’s Maxims of War” Translated by Colonel D’Aguilar, Arcturus Publishing, 2018, Pg. 21:

These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown or lost sight of in the Middle Ages. The crusaders in their incursions into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by superior numbers.

It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of resources.

Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little more than one thousand men.

Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid and well executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security, and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in the art of war.