On the Risks of Growing Ukrainian Participation in Armed Conflicts

Over the years of the war, Ukraine has acquired an exceptional range of military capabilities—from the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles and counter-drone operations to naval operations. Now, Western partners must determine in advance what rules will limit the use of this expertise outside Ukraine after the war. Reports of Ukrainian specialists operating in Africa and the Middle East raise questions for the West about the limits, oversight, and accountability regarding the military capabilities built with its support.

A CNN report titled “Ukraine is fighting Russia anywhere it can—even in the deserts of Africa,” advertising Ukrainian opportunities for participation in military conflicts, describes the presence of Ukrainian military specialists in Mali, Libya, Sudan, and at least five countries in the Middle East. In Mali, as reported in the article, they are helping local forces deploy drones against Russian units. In Libya, Ukrainian operators are involved in operations against Russia’s “shadow” maritime infrastructure. In the Middle East, Ukrainian teams have been sharing their expertise in countering Iranian-made drones. Each of these missions may have its own rationale, but taken together, they show that Ukraine does not view its military capabilities solely as a means of defending its own territory. In other words, Kyiv is offering its expertise as a service, including training, instructors, operational support, and drone technology. The question is who controls these exports: Ukraine’s military capabilities were not built in a vacuum—they were created with American and European funding.

Biden’s approach that the U.S. would “support Ukraine for as long as its needed” sounded like a moral commitment, but it was Biden himself who sent tens of billions of dollars to Ukraine without asking where that military capability would go after the war. Europe, for its part, did more than just help Kyiv hold the front lines—it effectively took on the responsibility of sustaining the Ukrainian state. The European Commission notes that since the start of the full-scale invasion, the EU and its member states have provided more than €220 billion in total aid to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. This figure includes financial, economic, humanitarian, and military support. For 2026–2027, the EU has also established the Ukraine Support Loan mechanism with a volume of up to €90 billion: approximately €60 billion is earmarked for Ukraine’s defense capabilities and defense industrial base, and approximately €30 billion is for budgetary support. For 2026, the European Union has set aside up to €45 billion, of which up to €28.3 billion is allocated to support defense capabilities and industry, and up to €16.7 billion is allocated for budgetary financing.

War shapes institutions, budgets, contractor networks, and political incentives geared toward its continuation. Today, Ukraine largely operates according to the logic of military survival: politics, industry, the budgetary system, and a significant portion of public life are subordinated to defense objectives. This explains why Zelenskyy has an interest in prolonging the conflict: he has material and political incentives not to end it. It is logical to expect that Kyiv will continue to expand its activities beyond Ukraine’s borders. However, as Ukraine demonstrates its ability to operate effectively on different continents, against various adversaries, and in all weather conditions, the question arises as to how controllable this military capability will remain in the long term.

People pose a separate problem. After the war, Ukraine and its partners will face the question: Where will the tens of thousands of people who have gained experience in one of the most technologically advanced wars of our time go? They may find themselves in demand in the gray area of private military operations—as instructors, contract soldiers, or technical specialists in conflicts that have nothing to do with the defense of Ukraine. Latin America is an example of a region where inexpensive drones and the demand for military services can strengthen criminal networks and fuel local conflicts.

These forces are already deployed in several countries: today they have one set of tasks, but tomorrow they could find themselves anywhere. This is not a minor issue for U.S. policy. When the United States supports a partner, it must consider what that partner’s military capabilities will look like in peacetime and in other regions.