EU Faces Hard Choices After LNG ‘Wake-Up Call’

Authored by Irina Slav, via OilPrice.com,

• Europe is growing uneasy over its heavy reliance on U.S. LNG, with EU officials warning that energy security risks are shifting rather than disappearing.

• Diversification options are limited: sanctions on Russian gas and strict EU methane regulations effectively rule out major suppliers like Russia, Qatar, and much of U.S. LNG.

• Gas costs and policy contradictions are rising, as Europe pushes for diversification while remaining locked into record U.S. LNG imports

The European Union needs to diversify its natural gas sources, Brussels’ energy commissioner said this week, expressing a growing unease in European capitals that the EU has become too dependent on liquefied natural gas from the United States. Yet succeeding in that diversification drive will be tricky because of the bloc’s emissions-focused energy policies – and the sanctions on Russia.

“We are speaking to countries around the world that are able to deliver LNG to us,” Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen told media in Brussels this week, as quoted by Bloomberg.

“I definitely hear this when speaking to energy ministers and heads of state from all over Europe that there is a growing concern.”

The situation represents an interesting reversal of sentiment from just four years ago. Back in 2022, the European Union declared it would switch from Russian pipeline gas as punishment for the invasion of eastern Ukraine and start buying U.S. liquefied gas instead. EU officials hailed the decision as a big step towards energy independence and praised U.S. LNG producers—and the U.S. federal government—as a reliable business partner and energy supplier.

Now, the European Union is the biggest regional buyer of U.S. liquefied gas, which seems to have been the plan all along—but that gas is coming at a steep cost, and with the federal government very different from the one of four years ago, the image of the reliable business partner and energy supplier has changed quite radically.

It was the Greenland affair that played the role of the alarm clock that woke Brussels and national capitals up. Until that point, the European leaders had apparently assumed that Trump would keep doing business with their countries—and the EU—as Biden had before him, namely by continuing the security guarantees and preferential trade arrangements that had been the hallmark of trans-Atlantic relations for decades. Only Trump did not feel like that. Trump demonstrated early on that he was coming to collect—higher NATO spending, import tariffs, and, finally, Greenland.

The myth of the friendly American LNG that could replace all Russian gas and ensure energy security for a continent was, however, dispelled even before Greenland, by Trump’s top energy man. Secretary Chris Wright stated plainly that U.S. producers of liquefied gas have no intention of complying with the EU’s new methane regulation. The regulation requires constant monitoring, tracking, and reporting of methane leaks along the LNG supply chain—and U.S. LNG producers are not investing in that. Incidentally, neither is QatarEnergy.

During his talk with reporters, Commissioner Jorgensen said that European gas buyers were eyeing Qatar, Canada, and Algeria as potential avenues for gas supply diversification. But Qatar, for one, has made it as clear as the U.S. that it will not be doing methane tracking and reporting. And it has done so repeatedly. And with the world’s two biggest LNG exporters out of the methane-reporting experiment, the EU is really short on options—especially now that the top brass in Brussels approved the total ban on any and all Russian gas imports, beginning next year. Of course, it’s still January 2026, and a lot of things could change over the next 12 months, with some observers of the EU arguing that it will soon change its tune on Russian gas. Until this argument finds factual backing, however, the EU is off Russian gas—and unless it drops the methane regulation, it is also out of Qatari and most U.S. gas, too. Alternatively, U.S. gas will simply become even more expensive, raising the question of just how long the EU would be able to afford it.

The bigger question is what the realistic alternatives to U.S. LNG are. The answer, alas, is unpleasant. There is no large enough LNG supplier to step in and take the place of the United States, not economically, at least. This means gas buyers in Europe would be scouring the world for LNG from now on in a bid to advance the new diversification vision of the Brussels political establishment.

Meanwhile, however, there is that trade deal that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed with President Trump last year that calls for $250 billion worth of U.S. energy imports into the EU every year until 2027. One could argue whether Trump knew the EU could not physically buy so much U.S. energy, but wanted to make them buy more oil and LNG—which is what he got, by the way. European Union imports of American LNG hit an all-time high last year, though their price was nowhere near $250 billion.

Trump probably knew the Europeans couldn’t buy $250 billion worth of oil and LNG. But if the Europeans get really serious about that diversification, the Greenland deal may be canceled in favor of another, more direct option. If anything, President Trump has proven repeatedly that he follows his own rules.