DOJ Criminal Conspiracy Revealed at Status Hearing for Ken Cromar Added to Criminal Referral to JAG

Community Support Foundation
Logan, Utah
October 21, 2023

Breaking News: DOJ Criminal Conspiracy Revealed at Status Hearing for Ken Cromar Added to Criminal Referral to JAG

A Status hearing was held on October 18, 2023 in the federal government’s second attempt to charge Ken Cromar with tax evasion, obstructing the IRS and forcibly retaking property that had been seized by the government to pay his alleged outstanding tax debt; even though Barbie & Ken Cromar have spent the last five years trying to defend themselves, while seeking justice from a corrupt Department of Justice starting with Chief Judge Robert J. Shelby, who denied the Cromar’s of lawful due process of law through his repeated denials of the Cromar’s motions for a hearing and pleas for justice.

The first forty-five minutes of the hour and half hearing was spent discussing Cromar’s Motion to Compel and the subject of the government’s failure to provide Ken Cromar of his “court ordered” discovery.  Judge Peade expressed his serious concerns about the difficulty Cromar has faced in obtaining the “court ordered” discovery and Cromar’s challenges accessing the Weber County Law Library. Judge Peade proposed an idea that Cromar could be moved from the Weber County Jail in Ogden to the Farmington (Davis County) Utah jail where he would be allowed to receive a laptop with all the discovery on it.  Cromar consented and then asked Judge Peade for a standby attorney, someone who would help him with his pleadings and be a legal runner for him, but not represent him.  Judge Peade agreed he would assign him one, on the condition that “Cromar would not have the attorney help create frivolous motions.”  Cromar asked what Judge Peade meant by the term “frivolous.” Judge Peade said “having the attorney write motions that are not backed up by legal authority.” Cromar consented to Judge Peade’s suggestion of having a meeting with an attorney to see if it would be a good fit.

Judge Peade’s conditional assistance of an attorney to assist Cromar was reminiscent of previous claims made against the Cromar’s in their five-year sage with the courts. False declarations of “Frivolous”, “vexatious”, “scandalous” were used as a pretense to block the Cromar’s honest declarations of truth on the record in one of their many previous, MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO PRODUCE DISCOVERY back on approximately March 3, 2022. Clearly, Judge Peade’s use of the term frivolous is an indicator that he is completely aware of the Cromar’s previous legal entanglements and the other court’s impediment to Cromar’s rights to due process of law. (Birds of a feather flock together) This would also mean that Judge Peade is also aware that the new indictment of Ken Cromar constitutes the prosecution of Cromar as a matter of Double Jeopardy, a concept which is meant to protect a person from multiple (malicious) prosecutions, convictions, or punishments for the same crime.

In Cromar’s Motion to Compel, before Judge Peade, Cromar requested a Certified Copy of the Original Complaint. Judge Peade stated “There was no complaint, so the request is satisfied.” Cromar responded with, “But it’s a rule of law that there has to be a complaint in order for an indictment to be created.” Judge Peade replied, “There is no legal authority to support that.” However, according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4. [28 U.S.C. Appendix] Summons (a) Contents; amendments. (1)  Contents. A summons must: (A) name the court and the parties; (B) be directed to the defendant; (C) state the name and address of the plaintiff’s attorney or—if unrepresented—of the plaintiff; (D) state the time within which the defendant must appear and defend; (E) notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint; (F) be signed by the clerk; and (G) bear the court’s seal. Was this an intentional misrepresentation of the law and facts by Judge Peade?

Cromar also requested a copy of the Original (before the return) Arrest Warrant used to arrest Cromar. Judge Peade said, “Both the returned and not returned are laid out in front of you. It was pulled from the docket.” Cromar replied, “It was not signed by a judge.” Judge Peade responded, “It didn’t have to be. There is no legal authority to support that.” Yet again, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4. Arrest Warrant or Summons on a Complaint (b) Form. (1) Warrant. A warrant must: (D) be signed by a judge. Was this another intentional misrepresentation of the law and facts by Judge Peade?

Cromar requested a Copy of the Pre-Trial services report. Judge Peade replied, “Will come as soon as the government can provide it.” Cromar then requested a copy of the arrest warrant signed by a judge. Judge Peade replied, “Does not need to be signed by a judge.” Yet, it has already been shown that a warrant must be signed by a judge. One can only wonder the reasons why a judge would be so willing to misrepresent the truth and the law?

Cromar then asked for a copy of the search warrant, Judge Peade replied, “Will be provided in discovery.” However, when Cromar asked for a copy of the Arresting Officer(s) Oath, a copy of the Arresting Officer’s Fidelity Bond, a copy of the Delegation of Authority along with a request to disclose all documents that “falsely claimed that defendant Cromar, among other things was a citizen to the united States and was not subject to federal income tax,” Judge Peade adamantly responded, “Frivolous and gibberish sovereign citizen language. Denied.”

Sovereign Citizen is an oxymoron, for you can either be a sovereign or a citizen, but you cannot be both. The issue is neither frivolous or gibberish because the term has been created by the courts (DOJ) as a means to label individuals who hold firmly to the Clearfield Doctrine, derived from the 1934 Supreme Court Decision in Clearfield Trust, et al. vs. United States, (328 U.S. 363, 318), the court ruled, in essence, that when a government reduces itself to a corporate status, it becomes merely another corporation, having no more or less standing than all other corporations. Thus, the lawful question of jurisdiction arises when a CORPORATION claims jurisdiction over a LIVING MAN because the claim causes the courts to enter into legal fiction commerce.

The United States Supreme Court has also ruled in 2000, Bond vs. United States 529 US 334-2000, that THE PEOPLE ARE IN FACT SOVEREIGN and NOT the States or government. The court went on to define that local, State and Federal law enforcement officers are committing unlawful actions against the Sovereign people by the enforcement of laws and are personally liable for their actions.

Ken Cromar has filed and recorded, in multiple places, the following declaration:

Paul-Kenneth: Cromar, is not a United States Citizen, subject, vessel or “person” as defined in Title 26 United States Code Section 7701 or elsewhere, or any other ens legis artificial person, individual, entity, fiction of law, procedural phantom or juristic personality, notwithstanding the reproduction of any such fictions in any media, computer, record or instrument, written or electronic. 

Furthermore, Paul-Kenneth: Cromar, is foreign to the United States and retains official authority within his chosen jurisdiction. As beneficiary to the original Jurisdiction, he is not subject to nor does He volunteer to submit to or contract with any ens legis artificial or corporate jurisdiction to which a United States person may be subject.

Paul-Kenneth: Cromar, did not, does not, nor does he ever intend to volunteer, consent or contract to being identified as, of, or connected by any nexus to, any institutional, bifurcated, public cestui que trust or other fictional construction of law or ens legis entity of a political state or subdivision thereof, in any capacity including, without limitation, as trustee, co-trustee, surety, co-security, officer, co-officer, fiduciary, or co-fiduciary.

Legal Jurisdiction over him as a man is derived from consent to contract into legal fiction commerce. If there is no valid contract, there is no jurisdiction. No legal or lawful matter can proceed without jurisdiction. “Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.” Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533

“Jurisdiction, once challenged, is to be proven, not by the court, but by the party attempting to assert jurisdiction. The burden of proof of jurisdiction lies with the asserter.” See McNutt v. GMAC, 298 US 178. And Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 US 308

“Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action.” Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026

“There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215

“Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910

When Cromar requested a copy of the warrant authorized by telephone means and a copy of the testimony recorded verbatim by an electronic recording device, Judge Peade responded, “Oh, this is regarding the Jencks Act. Not required by any rule of law. Denied.”

Cromar requested a copy of all evidence, field notes… used by witness for the Government and Prosecutor Woolf responded, “I will get you what I can.” As Cromar asked for them to provide a certified copy of the return of the warrant, Judge Peade replied, “Will come in discovery.”

Cromar asked, “Please provide any rules or authority for the return of the warrant to be filed (blank) without being completed by the arresting officer and the Clerk’s attestation and seal and Judge Peade stated, “Previously addressed.”

Cromar asked for a Certified copy of the indictment filed with the typed name and wet ink signature, to which Judge Peade replied, “Does not need to have a signature or name. Denied.” Again, we have previously shown that a summons/indictment must: be signed by the clerk; and bear the court’s seal.

When Cromar asked them to provide a witness list, judge Peade replied, “Not required. Not cited. Request is frivolous. (???) Denied.”

42 CFR § 93.513 – Submission of witness lists, witness statements, and exhibits

(a) By 60 days before the scheduled hearing date, each party must give the ALJ a list of witnesses to be offered during the hearing and a statement describing the substance of their proposed testimony, copies of any prior written statements or transcribed testimony of proposed witnesses, a written report of each expert witness to be called to testify that meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), and copies of proposed hearing exhibits, including copies of any written statements that a party intends to offer instead of live direct testimony. If there are no prior written statements or transcribed testimony of a proffered witness, the party must submit a detailed factual affidavit of the proposed testimony.

Cromar followed up with, “Provide a complete transcript of the Grand Jury Hearing, a copy of the date the Grand Jury was sworn in, and a copy of the names and county and state for the empaneled Grand Jury.” Judge Peade responded with, “Not required.  Not cited.  Request is frivolous. (???)   Denied. 

Federal criminal discovery is governed by three sources of law: (1) Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, (2) the Supreme Court cases of Brady and Giglio, and (3) the Jencks Act.

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the rule that controls discovery in federal criminal cases. Under Rule 16, once a defendant makes a demand on the government, the government is required to produce items such as the defendant’s statements, the defendant’s criminal record, reports of any examinations and tests, documents or other physical objects it intends to introduce at trial, and more. Once the defendant invokes Rule 16 for discovery, the government can demand the same from the defendant.

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court found that the government has a duty to produce exculpatory evidence to the defendant

In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Supreme Court extended Brady’s rule to cover impeachment information. That means that any information that undermines the credibility of a witness must be disclosed to the defense.

Brady and Giglio are extremely important to defendants in criminal cases. While the government is required to proactively produce this information, often it is up to the defendant’s lawyer to fully investigate and ensure anything exculpatory is made available to the defense. Ken Cromar’s Motion to Compel should act as a letter to the government outlining the things that he believes are exculpatory. By doing so, Cromar can ensure that the government will not overlook certain evidence that is potentially exculpatory.

The Jencks Act is the final source of discovery for criminal defendants. Under the Jencks Act, a party calling a witness is required to produce any prior recorded statements of that witness pertaining to the witness’s testimony. For example, if the government calls a law enforcement agent to testify about an investigation, any recordings or reports authored by that agent must be produced to the defendant. However, the Jencks Act only applies to “recorded statements”. If something was not recorded or written down, the Jencks Act would not compel the government to produce the notes of the interview.

Together, Rule 16, Brady/Giglio, and the Jencks Act represent the primary sources of discovery available to defendants in a federal criminal case. To ensure that the maximum amount of information is obtained under each, the defense team must be diligent in their investigation of the evidence. It is important for the defense team to not only understand what has been provided but to also understand what has not been provided.

Since the government has shown its willingness to delay/hide Discovery evidence or even provide the witnesses who will be called to testify against him, there is no honorable reason to withhold the Grand Jury transcripts and the requested Grand Jury information. Nor is there any reason to accept the government’s statements as a credible source of truth and honesty.

Cromar asked for a copy of the audio recording as required by FRCrP paragraph 6(e), and Judge Peade replied, “Not required, but I will consider. Video not available and is not privileged.” Cromar followed with, “Disclose all under-cover informant(s) that have been used or involved with this case. Judge Peade replied, “I will have the Government get you what they can.

Cromar asked them to disclose any jailhouse information(s) or snitch(s) used to develop the charges in this case and requested a Copy of any audio or video involving the Defendant’s calls from jail to his family. Judge Peade replied, “Weber County correctional has its own rules and I will not tread on them. Denied.”

Cromar asked them to disclose all reports, field notes, emails… during the “audit of defendant Cromar related to tax years 1999 through 2005 and to disclose any and all “notice of assessments” that have been provided to Defendant. Judge Peade responded with, “Will be provided in the discovery.”

When Cromar asked them to disclose a true and complete Bill of Particulars. Judge Peade replied, “The indictment is better than the Bill of Particulars. Request is satisfied.”

Finally, when Cromar addressed how the government is failing on providing the “court ordered” evidence and discovery, Judge Peade made specific reference to Brady, Giglio, and Jencks. He turned to Prosecutor Woolf, with a stern voice, and told him that he agrees with Mr. Cromar. Judge Peade then told Prosecutor Woolf that if the Government does not comply 100%, he will dismiss this case.

As previously stated under Rule 16, once a defendant makes a demand on the government, the government is required to produce the “court ordered” discovery which includes items such as the defendant’s statements, the defendant’s criminal record, reports of any examinations and tests, documents or other physical objects it intends to introduce at trial, and more.

Judges and Prosecutors are bound by a set of rules which outline fair and dispassionate conduct, both of which have the glaring appearance of being violated in the prosecution of Ken Cromar. Judge Peade’s comments and seeming willful misrepresentation of the facts and law may rise to the level of Judicial misconduct, which occurs when a judge acts in ways that are considered unethical or otherwise violate the judge’s obligations of impartial conduct.

Thus, Magistrate Peade’s statement that “if the Government does not comply 100% then he will dismiss this case,” may well be in the best interest of everyone, because the repeated Constitutional violations, all throughout the two fraudulent cases again the Cromars, has been added to the Numerous Criminal Complaints/Referrals that have already been filed against Merrick B. Garland US Attorney General and other Officers of the Court, which were submitted to the US Department of Justice, and who has been affirmed by the DOJ as the lawful jurisdiction of the Military in matters involving Misprision and Violations of One’s Oath of Office.

Where there is smoke, there is fire!

Tom Fairbanks
Intelligence Support Activity (ISA)
Community Health Advocate
Community Support Foundation
communitysupportfoundation@protonmail.com