Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Revealed: Ahead of Merkavot Gideon B, the IDF ordered forces to allow Hamas
to smuggle the hostages out of the combat zone

Guidance documents for Division 36 during the operation, obtained by Makor
Rishon, show how directives from the Prisoners and Missing Persons Command
forced the IDF into inefficient fighting.
The proposed principle of operation in an area where there is feasibility of
hostages: “avoid contact with the terrorists.”

Yishai Elmakis-Elram
Makor Rishon – 12 December 2025 page 8
[Translation of the Hebrew article]

When the IDF was engaged in preparations to deepen Operation Merkavot Gideon
B in the Gaza Strip, even before a ceasefire agreement and a hostage deal
came onto the agenda, unusual directives were issued in Southern Command to
the maneuvering forces, requiring the fighters on the ground to place
themselves and the mission at risk – in order to almost completely avoid
endangering the hostages, and even to allow the terrorists to escape with
them to the Mawasi area, the humanitarian zone west of Khan Yunis. The main
concern of the commanders was harm to living hostages, many of whom were
held in the urban combat area.

The explicit orders appear in an official document of Division 36 that
reached Makor Rishon already at that time, but only now can it be revealed.
The directives reveal a troubling picture: the IDF planned a ground
operation contrary to every known principle of warfare. Among other things,
the document details “situations that place the hostages at risk,” which are
lessons learned from previous incidents in which hostages were apparently
killed during maneuvering. Among the dangers listed in the document:
“physical and tangible proximity” between the forces and the terrorists
holding the hostages; “lack of escape capability and a sense of encirclement
on the part of the terrorists”; situations in which the hostages become a
burden on terrorists seeking to flee; and also “enemy surprise situations in
proximity to POW/MIA” (prisoners and missing persons – Y.E.).

The operational response proposed by the document is divided into three:
reducing risk to the hostages even at the cost of harming the mission –
which, as remembered, is the defeat of Hamas; managing risks by marking
areas suspected of holding hostages; and preserving maneuver principles
unique to an area in which hostages may be present.

The operational solution defined according to the directive of the POW/MIA
Command is almost completely contrary to the familiar IDF combat doctrine.
Instead of surprise, encirclement, and rapid movement, the document states
that the forces must “avoid encirclement, including a sense of encirclement,
and leave escape routes.”

Above ground, it is required to “maintain open escape axes and avoid
neutralizing shafts.” Underground, it was determined that one must ensure
“relative operational clarity for the enemy so that he avoids a sense of
encirclement and understands that he has escape routes.” Accordingly, the
instruction was to operate slowly, in a “gradual, systematic, linear, and
non-eruptive operation, in order not to alarm the terrorists.” The forces
were also required to “avoid the use of violent means underground” and to
fire “coordinated and selective fire.” In addition, it was noted that in the
event of resistance by terrorists underground or in front of doors and other
obstacles that are possible signs of “the presence of hostages, one must
immediately stop for a situation assessment” and “prioritize intelligence
and POW/MIA efforts at the expense of the rate of advance.”

According to the document, the principle of operation in an area where there
is feasibility of living hostages is “to avoid any contact with the
terrorists, in favor of pushing the enemy and the POW/MIA into civilian
areas without maneuver,” while creating updated intelligence and conditions
for their extraction.

In the divisional document it was defined that in the Khan Yunis area “the
desired situation” is that all living hostages will be transferred – by the
enemy, of course – to the Mawasi area, where they will be protected and
outside the maneuver sector.

In the Khan Yunis sector it was defined that as long as it is not possible
to rule out the presence of living hostages in a specific tunnel route, an
escape route must be left to a central tunnel that served as the
headquarters of senior Hamas figures. It was also determined that one must
not approach it under any circumstances above ground or below it, and that a
passage route from it to Mawasi above ground must be preserved. It should be
noted that immediately after the return of the living hostages, that
senior-officials’ tunnel was bombed from the air.

The method of warfare taking place these days in Rafah against terrorists
who are not holding hostages is completely opposite. The action against
terrorists entrenched in tunnels includes tight encirclement, reduction of
water and food supplies, and aggressive combat actions above ground and
underground. This pressure, say the IDF, leads the terrorists to surface,
where some surrender and others are eliminated. According to the army,
dozens of terrorists were also eliminated inside the tunnel itself, and the
number of those remaining alive is very low.

The intelligence that the IDF had regarding the presence of living hostages
in tunnels in the Gaza Strip led the POW/MIA Command to determine the
operational combat concept for the maneuvering forces. It appears that were
it not for the ceasefire agreement imposed on the IDF – which halted the
deepening of the maneuver in Gaza – the ground operation that was planned in
the slow, schematic, and predictable method, which allows the enemy to
retreat and survive, could have ended at a much heavier price – both for the
fighters and for the hostages.
________________________________________
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Source: https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74400