Parody: SGS To Document And Supervise Hezbollah's Weapons Inventory

Parody: SGS To Document And Supervise Hezbollah’s Weapons Inventory
Dr. Aaron lerner 19 November 2024

Dear Reader,

Yes – it would be absurd for the international inspection company, SGS, =
to
catalog and label all the weapons Hezbollah has at the moment of a =
ceasefire
and then serve as an intermediary when Israel claims Hezbollah has added
weapons to their inventory.

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein is working on an equally absurd proposal.

Correction: a WORSE proposal.

Why worse?

Because, beyond allowing Hezbollah to keep all their weapons, U.S. =
envoy
Amos Hochstein is proposing that we enter into negotiations for “border
adjustments”.

That’s right. =20

The Biden administration thinks it would be a swell idea to reward =
Hezbollah
with Israeli territory.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=20
[PARODY] Protocol for Inspection and Oversight of Hezbollah Weapons
Inventory under Ceasefire Agreement

Objective

This protocol establishes a framework for inventorying, monitoring, and
overseeing Hezbollah=92s arsenal of rockets, missiles, drones, and =
related
weaponry during a ceasefire. It aims to ensure compliance with the =
ceasefire
terms while respecting Lebanon=92s sovereignty and minimizing civilian =
harm.

Section I: Initial Inventory and Identification by Societe Generale de
Surveillance (SGS)

1. Inventory Procedure
=95 SGS will conduct a comprehensive inventory of all rockets,
missiles, drones, and other weaponry in Hezbollah=92s possession.
=95 Hezbollah will grant SGS unrestricted access to its storage
facilities and weapons caches under strict confidentiality to ensure
transparency.

2. Identification and Tagging
=95 SGS will apply tamper-proof stickers or markers to each
weapon. These stickers will:
=95 Be uniquely numbered to correspond with the weapon.
=95 Include security features to prevent counterfeiting.
=95 Be durable and resistant to environmental damage.
=95 Each weapon will be photographed and cataloged alongside its
unique number in a secure, centralized database maintained by SGS.

3. Reporting and Documentation
=95 SGS will produce an inventory report listing all weapons,
their unique identifiers, and storage locations. This report will be =
shared
confidentially with the ceasefire stakeholders: Hezbollah, Israel, and =
the
designated ceasefire monitoring body (e.g., UN representatives).

Section II: Handling Claims of Additional Weapons

1. Submission of Evidence
=95 If Israel identifies suspected new weapons not included in
the initial inventory, it will submit evidence to SGS. Evidence must
include:
=95 Location coordinates.
=95 Supporting data from satellite imagery, reconnaissance, or
other verifiable sources.

2. Unannounced Inspections
=95 SGS will dispatch inspectors without prior warning to the
specified locations to verify the claim.
=95 Inspectors will document their findings, including
photographing the weapons and checking for the absence of inventory
stickers.

3. Resolution of Violations
=95 If SGS confirms the presence of new, undocumented weapons:
=95 Hezbollah will be given the opportunity to destroy the
weapons under SGS supervision.
=95 If Hezbollah refuses, Israel will have the right to
neutralize the weapons.
=95 Israel=92s actions must comply with proportionality
requirements outlined in international humanitarian law:
=95 Civilian casualties must be minimized.
=95 If weapons are in a civilian-populated area, Israel must use
precision methods or seek alternative solutions to avoid significant =
harm to
non-combatants.

Section III: Replacement of Defective Weapons

1. Procedure for Replacement
=95 Hezbollah may replace defective weapons with functional ones
under SGS supervision.
=95 SGS will:
=95 Verify the defectiveness of the weapon being replaced.
=95 Assign a unique sticker to the new weapon and update the
inventory database.

2. Transparency and Accountability
=95 All replacements will be documented in a supplemental report
by SGS and shared with ceasefire stakeholders to ensure transparency.

Section IV: Provisions for Unilateral Destruction of Inventory Weapons =
by
Israel

1. Documentation of Destruction
=95 In the event that Israel conducts a unilateral attack
against Hezbollah, causing damage or destruction to weapons included in =
the
official inventory, SGS will verify and document the losses.
=95 The verification process will involve:
=95 Inspecting the destroyed sites.
=95 Comparing the destroyed weapons to the inventory database
using their unique identifiers.

2. Replacement of Destroyed Weapons
=95 Hezbollah will have the right to replace weapons destroyed
in unilateral Israeli attacks, subject to the following conditions:
=95 Replacements must be of the same type and quantity as the
destroyed weapons.
=95 The replacement process will be conducted under SGS
supervision to ensure transparency.
=95 The new weapons will be assigned unique stickers and updated
in the inventory database.

3. Reporting
=95 SGS will provide a detailed report on the destruction and
replacement process to all ceasefire stakeholders to ensure =
accountability.

Section V: Israel=92s Monitoring Restrictions

1. Respect for Sovereignty
=95 Israel will not conduct monitoring activities that violate
Lebanon=92s territorial integrity.
=95 Monitoring will rely on:
=95 Satellite imagery.
=95 Reconnaissance conducted from beyond Lebanese airspace or
territorial waters.

2. Monitoring Distance
=95 A minimum distance of:
=95 20 km offshore from Lebanese territorial waters for maritime
surveillance.
=95 5 km from the Lebanon-Israel border for land-based
monitoring, ensuring no violation of airspace.

3. Altitude Considerations
=95 Israel will utilize high-altitude surveillance methods that
do not infringe upon Lebanese airspace sovereignty. While there is no
universally agreed-upon vertical boundary between national airspace and
outer space, the K=E1rm=E1n line at 100 km altitude is commonly used as =
a
reference point. Israel will ensure that any aerial surveillance =
platforms
operate at altitudes above 100 km to avoid violating Lebanese airspace.

4. Reporting Mechanisms
=95 Israel will submit findings to SGS for verification rather
than act unilaterally, ensuring all claims are addressed through the
protocol.

Section VI: Oversight and Compliance

1. Ceasefire Monitoring Body
=95 A neutral monitoring body (e.g., the United Nations) will
oversee the implementation of this protocol and address disputes.

2. Regular Audits
=95 SGS will conduct periodic audits of Hezbollah=92s weapon
inventory to ensure compliance.
=95 Any discrepancies will be reported immediately to all
stakeholders.

3. Accountability Measures
=95 Violations of the protocol by either party will be referred
to the ceasefire monitoring body for resolution and potential sanctions.

Section VII: Conclusion

This protocol balances the need for accountability with the respect for
sovereignty and international law. By leveraging the expertise of SGS =
and
implementing clear procedures, it ensures that all parties adhere to the
ceasefire terms while minimizing risks to civilians and maintaining =
regional
stability.
________________________________________
IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis

Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus =
on
Arab-Israeli relations

Website: www.imra.org.il

Source: https://www.imra.org.il/story.php?id=74275