Beyond Hub-and-Spoke: The Emerging Case for Asian NATO

No one in Asia wants a de Gaulle — collectively, at least

In October 2025, Sanae Takaichi made history as the first woman to lead Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, positioning herself to become the country’s first female prime minister. Her ascent breaks a longstanding political glass ceiling, yet her alignment with Shinzo Abe’s revisionist nationalism raises a critical question within Japan’s strategic circles: will Takaichi advance a revisionist, minilateral ‘coalition of the willing’ approach, or will she endorse a broader Asian adaptation of a NATO-style multilateral framework under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, thereby grounding cooperation in historical reflection and pacifist principles with neighboring countries—and in doing so, redefine the path set by her centrist predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba? The emergence of de Gaulle-like figures in the Indo-Pacific poses challenges not only to U.S. interests but also to those of most Asian countries, making this strategic choice consequential for the region’s future architecture.

In September 2024, outgoing Prime Minister Ishiba laid out a comprehensive vision in an op-ed for the Hudson Institute, proposing the creation of an ‘Asian NATO.’ Stressing the widespread post-Ukraine sentiment that “Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow,” Ishiba warned that the absence of a collective self-defense system comparable to NATO in Asia heightens the risk of conflict because no formal obligation for mutual defense exists among regional partners. He thus argued for institutionalizing a new regional security framework, explaining that “if these alliances are upgraded, a hub-and-spoke system, with the Japan-U.S. alliance at its core, will be established, and in the future, it will be possible to develop the alliance into an Asian version of NATO.”

While Ishiba’s proposal reflected his nationalist impulse to anchor any such structure around the U.S.-Japan alliance, his advocacy for moderate multilateralism implied a broader strategic evolution—from the U.S.-centric ‘hub-and-spoke’ model toward a value-chained, ‘spoke-to-spoke’ framework linking Indo-Pacific partners. Critics, however, noted that his essay lacked a clear articulation of how Japan could build the necessary like-mindedness with neighboring states to sustain such institution-building efforts. In his commemorative speech marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba offered a clue, emphasizing that future cooperation must be grounded in historical reflection: “We must not repeat the mistakes of steering the nation astray by prioritizing emotional and sentimental judgments over rational ones.”

Growing U.S. Consensus Over Asian NATO

When Ishiba first presented the concept to U.S. security policy circles, the State Department responded cautiously. Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, commented, “It’s too early to talk about collective security in that context, and [the creation of] more formal institutions.” He did, however, acknowledge the importance of the U.S. continuing “to invest in the region’s existing formal architecture and continuing to build this network of formal and informal relationships,” which serves to prevent allies from retreating into isolated, ‘go-it-alone’ postures through enhanced collective deterrence, rapid military response, intelligence sharing, and joint logistics.

The restrained discourse surrounding a potential Asian NATO that prevailed under the Biden administration has shifted noticeably with the advent of the second Trump administration. Elbridge Colby—principal architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and now serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy—has rolled out a conservative multilateral framework of ‘collective defense,’ rooted in the Trumpian logic of ‘peace through strength’ and ‘burden-sharing.’ In a post on X commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Colby sketched out how collective defense could take shape in the Indo-Pacific, asserting that “everyone must contribute and be prepared to bear the weight of collective defense,” and adding that “Pacifism is not the answer. To the contrary, peace through strength is. That is the policy we are carrying to our allies in the Asia-Pacific.” He further linked this message to the imperative of defense-industrial resilience, emphasizing that “the lessons of war are clear: our military must be prepared to fight and defend against aggression toward its core interests, especially in Asia,” and stressing the need for “an industrial base to support it.”

Complementing Colby’s assertive posture, Ely Ratner—who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs under the Biden administration—advanced a related, though more institutionalist, argument during a recent Carnegie Endowment podcast. Ratner contended that the prevailing minilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ architecture remains too informal to sustain the level of operational integration required among the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Echoing Colby’s concern for alliance durability, he urged U.S. allies to pursue Reciprocal Access Agreements(RAAs) that would institutionalize joint military exercises and foster deeper multilateral coordination across the Indo-Pacific.

Ishiba’s proposal has garnered cautious yet growing interest among U.S. officials, who view it as harmonizing with efforts to deepen Indo-Pacific multilateral cooperation by emphasizing alliance cohesion, burden-sharing, and institutionalized collaboration that complements existing commitments without overextending U.S. obligations. Although the concept often faces skepticism outside the U.S., especially from India and ASEAN states protective of their strategic autonomy, some interest groups even within these non-aligned countries may find it politico-economically advantageous.

Politico-Economic Benefits: from Critical Minerals to Unified Threat Perception

Despite its contentious nature, the current Indo-Pacific geopolitical climate is conducive to fostering a unified strategic voice through Asian NATO, especially among like-minded states; China’s rising hegemonic ambitions increasingly manifest in unilateral military incursions using ‘grey zone’ tactics that stop short of open conflict, while its strategic use of economic leverage compels neighbors to diversify trade and stabilize fragile supply chains.

If realized, an Asian NATO would offer multiple substantive benefits: an institutionally stable supply chain network, formalized mechanisms for building and sustaining trust among members independent of regime changes, and a unified, enduring threat perception against China.

Critical Minerals and Defense Supply Chains

Drawing from NATO’s cooperation on critical minerals, the 2024 Defence-Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap identifies twelve essential Critical Raw Materials vital for defense industries, such as aluminum, graphite, cobalt, and rare earth elements. These materials underpin advanced military capabilities—from lightweight aircraft and missiles to stealth submarine components and jet engine superalloys. With China controlling 60–90% of global processing capacity for many of these materials, NATO’s strategy focuses on diversifying supply through partnerships with allies like Australia and Canada, boosting domestic production, maintaining strategic stockpiles, advancing recycling technologies, and researching substitutes. The roadmap, in sum, emphasizes coordinated procurement policies and market oversight to guard against supply manipulation. Emulating this model, an Asian NATO would institutionalize reciprocal commitments and protect critical infrastructure to ensure resilient, uninterrupted military and civilian supply chains, thereby countering geopolitical risks and enhancing regional readiness.

Institutionalizing Trust Across Regime Changes

Trust among Asian NATO members would be formalized through institutional mechanisms designed to remain resilient across political transitions. NATO’s 32 members maintain trust through nearly a few hundred standardized joint military exercises conducted annually, integrated command structures, and binding mutual defense commitments under Article 5. These mechanisms build predictability and habitual cooperation despite political shifts. According to Pew Research survey data, public opinion in NATO member states remains largely favorable, with a median of 66% viewing the alliance positively, reflecting broad underlying support for NATO’s continuity despite political changes. This institutionalized, recurrent engagement effectively counters fragmentation risks common in informal regional groupings, providing a robust framework that an Asian NATO would seek to emulate.

Sustaining Unified Threat Perception

Most significantly, an Asian NATO’s formal institutionalization would sustain an enduring collective threat perception regarding China by coordinating surveillance of China’s expanding military presence and coercive policies throughout the Indo-Pacific. NATO’s pre-summit polling results released in June 2024 identified China’s ambitions as a central challenge; recent polling shows that roughly 48% of respondents in NATO countries hold an unfavorable view of China, while only 14% view China favorably, highlighting broad concern about China’s role as a security threat among the alliance’s populations. Similarly, an Asian NATO could create an enduring unified voice, with member states collectively recognizing that China’s aggressive activities in the South and East China Seas and its increased military capabilities near Taiwan deepen distrust and warrant coordinated responses.

Future Challenges: Mission Specialization and Public Acceptance

As the strategic option of creating an Asian NATO becomes geopolitically favorable, security experts emphasize the necessity of bilateral Reciprocal Access Agreements(RAA) and Visiting Force Agreements(VFA) among like-minded Asian countries as foundational steps. Public acceptance of these frameworks constitutes a vital test for trust-building. The United States must therefore carefully guide mission specialization to achieve public approval and strengthen regional security cooperation.

Within NATO, mission specialization among Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom illustrates how divergent but complementary capabilities build alliance cohesion and trust. Germany specializes in armored and mechanized ground forces, providing essential heavy land defense capabilities anchored in European theater security. Turkey, strategically located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, offers versatile contributions including robust land forces, strong missile defense capabilities, maritime and air policing, and commands key missions such as KFOR in Kosovo, thereby enhancing NATO’s southern flank deterrence and operational reach. The United Kingdom, drawing on its expeditionary legacy, excels in naval power through aircraft carriers and submarines, and fields elite special operations forces enabling rapid crisis response.

The United States has historically facilitated a balance among these members by encouraging Germany’s continental ground force focus, leveraging Turkey’s geographic and operational versatility, and integrating the United Kingdom’s maritime and special forces expertise. This deliberate specialization avoided duplication, fostered operational complementarity, and built the mutual trust necessary for public and intergovernmental approval of Reciprocal Access Agreements and Visiting Force Agreements, which provide NATO with the operational framework for deployment and defense cooperation.

For the Indo-Pacific, the United States should encourage tailored specialization aligned with geography and strategic needs within flexible minilateral frameworks rather than formal alliances. By fostering transparency, interoperability, and joint capacity-building, Washington can help regional partners develop complementary defense roles. Such an approach would gradually build the public trust and political legitimacy required for broader reciprocal access arrangements—without triggering the sensitivities associated with an overt “Asian NATO.”

Source: https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2025/11/12/beyond-hub-and-spoke-the-emerging-case-for-asian-nato/