Air defence for the UK in 2026

A bit later than intended: but I said we’d have a post on Badenoch and her £10 bn ‘Britannia Shield’. 

One should never fall for “the bomber will always get through” as an excuse for doing nothing.  She’s right that we haven’t been doing remotely enough.  But we need to examine both the history of our air defences and the current threats, to recognise the challenge we face.

1.  WW1  No air defences at all, until some fighters were belatedly deployed against Zeppelins.  Even then, the casualties per ton of bombs dropped, on an essentially unprepared nation, were extraordinary – so much so that, extrapolating to the Luftwaffe’s bombing resources, it was estimated that London alone would suffer a quarter of a million casualties in the first week of a prospective WW2**.

2.  WW2  Fortunately, this didn’t result in a policy of What’s The Point?  Quite the reverse.  Making good use of the months of Phoney War, effective multi-layer defences were instituted.  Radar station, very capable fighter cover, barrage balloons, anti-aircraft guns, air raid shelters of various types, blackouts, ARP wardens and teams of fire watchers.  

All very well: but that’s a time of flat-out national effort, no expense spared.

Cold War  A very different enemy, based in East Germany and point eastwards, with no aircraft carriers.  Our interceptors were pretty effective but, by the 1960s, few in number: our long-range AA missiles (Bloodhound, Thunderbird) were not impressive, neither in quality nor quantity.  Quite plainly, the strategy was one of (a) forward defence on the Lüneburg Heide & (b) hide behind the Americans.  

The one area in which some rather more impressive protective measures were put in place against air attack was the Navy, which was then upgraded significantly post Falklands / Exocet. 

But now, however well armed, we can’t muster a single destroyer on demand!  So a protective line of these vessels is certainly out of the question.

Threat in 2026  It’s not bombers!  RAF Typhoons may be expected to make short work of any stray Tu-95s.  Clearly, it’s cruise missiles (however launched), ballistic missiles and, since Ukraine’s impressive Spiderweb operation, drones launched from lurking trucks and coastal vessels.  Here’s the thing.  The USA and Israel have invested mightily in “exquisite” air defences, and since February have been comprehensively taken to the cleaners by Iran.  

Solutions  Our needs are not the same as theirs, however; and as regards long range missiles, forward defence in the classic sense remains the solution (though not for Poland et al).  What else can / should be done?

Firstly, get the well-armed destroyers operational!  In recent years the Navy has become a disgrace.  (Gordon Brown’s bloody aircraft carriers are of course much to blame.)   

We may safely rule out Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ as a solution or model for us: £10 bn doesn’t buy you much down that track.  Passive defence – hardening our military assets – must be part of the plan: but Russia, the USA, Israel and the Gulf States have discovered that it’s really difficult to protect infrastructure (being static, with locations known precisely).  The Russians have in fact tried to harden their refineries, to no avail.  (As regards the Spiderweb military targets, they hadn’t even tried.)

When we get down to the level of hostile drone swarms, it’s not clear the ‘nuclear option’ – even supposing we had an independent capability – gets us very far.  Another very important form of forward defence is intelligence from all sources, which should definitely be beefed up: we’re even quite good at it.  

Which brings us to tech solutions, which probably require a load of R&D – and not into the exquisite systems that can’t be afforded.  Early-warning detection systems are definitely needed for ship-launched short-range cruise missiles: shouldn’t be beyond the nation that developed radar.  The real puzzle is the drone swarm from within, or just offshore.  Detection at a distance?  I am not abreast of the latest technology, but it seems implausible to me.  However, no detection = precious little chance of shooting down: so R&D should go into that, too.  If the drones were to be guided or require Starlink, it’s possible GCHQ might have a very useful role.  But Ukraine deploys pre-programmed autonomous drones requiring merely the initial launch command.   

Finally, bringing down drones on the perimeter of targets, ‘Goalkeeper‘ style (albeit all these things are easier at sea).  We’re in danger of getting into science fiction here, but is there some kind of laser etc that could both detect and defeat an attack on the spot?  It needs to be cheap, if it’s to be deployed at scale. 

Last thought: we should (continue to) stay close to Ukraine in these matters.  They are so far ahead of the game, we could do a lot worse than making this a joint venture. 

Any other perspectives?

ND

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** The authorities were debating as to whether the bodies should be dumped in to the gravel pits where Heathrow is today, or into the Thames at high tide.

Source: http://www.cityunslicker.co.uk/2026/10/air-defence-for-uk-in-2026.html