Russian strategy revisited

Last year I offered a short account of how evolving Russian practice on the Ukrainian battlefield was starting to show signs of being in pursuit of an identifiable strategy (after two years of unbelievably inept, strategy-free military nonsense); and how that would be viewed – highly critically – through the lens of classic Soviet military doctrine.  The current state of the Trump-triggered “negotiations” makes it useful to revisit that account, and add a bit more salient detail from that Soviet playbook.

Recapping: under Soviet doctrine the offensive should be mounted on a series of broadly parallel axes, simultaneously, across a fairly wide front.  A graphic analogy might be swinging forcefully into the opponent with a heavy club featuring several long, protruding sharp nails.  The desired ‘phase 1′ effect is inflicting direct damage, plus pinning the enemy into position with much reduced ability to manoeuvre to right, left, or even backwards.  The doctrine prescribes several subsequent phases to deal with what remains, and straighten the line between the multiple puncture-incursions made in phase 1.

That’s if the action lasts beyond the first several days of phase 1.  We didn’t extend the account in that earlier post: but taking matters a stage beyond the initial phase, the Russians foresaw a contingency in which NATO, reeling from the initial, puncturing blow but for whatever reason unwilling to escalate to nukes, called for a ‘freeze’ and negotiations.  In such a case, the Russian claim on territory would essentially be delineated by just that straightened line, obtained (more or less) by joining the dots between the furthest point reached of each of the breakthrough axes.  Obviously, there would be some finessing: if they’d over-reached on one axis, they’d be only too happy to ‘concede’ along that line and fall back to something handily defensible.

Then … rinse and repeat on a rachet basis twenty years later, or whatever.

The Soviet critique of Russia’s performance 2022-25 would be simple: beyond Day 1 back in Feb ’22, where’s the shock?  The whole strategy is predicated on massive firepower and speed, see the earlier post[1].

However … perhaps all these lessons have been learned, and Russia intends its 2025 summer campaign to culminate in just such an offensive.  It’s not difficult to conceive the current state of play on the  Kharkiv front as being shaped for such a development, and even posit the precise axes that would be involved.  Ditto the front south of Ukraine’s ‘fortress belt’.

And Trump looks just the man to sit with a map, extend his stumpy finger, and offer Putin the territory east of a straightened line of his own devising [2].  I’d judge Putin’s dream outcome for 2025 would be an offensive like the one surmised above over the next several weeks; then a sit-down with Trump and a big map before the autumn rains begin.  Militarily, anything oversimplified in geographical / topographical terms could be an utter disaster for Ukraine.  Out on those open plains, largely devoid of the hills and forests we automatically think of in Western Europe, the only inherent primary obstacles are water-courses, towns and strongpoints.  Failure to factor in the precise geography of the water-courses in particular, and as a defender you’re sunk. 

Well, Putin can dream.  Let’s see what kind of Soviet-style offensive his army can muster in the next few weeks.  I doubt Stalin would be particularly impressed.  

ND

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[1] Also upon the 3rd of the triad: manoeuvre – see that earlier post – absence of which would be another major criticism of Russia’s current venture.

[2] I’ll tell another story on that theme next week